cognitive science, it characterizes cognitive processes in terms of the propagation and transformation of representations. What distinguishes distributed cognition from other approaches is the commitment to two related theoretical principles.
The first concerns the boundaries of the unit of analysis for cognition. The second concerns the range of mechanisms that may be assumed to participate in cognitive processes. While mainstream cognitive science looks for cognitive events in the manipulation of symbols (Newell, et.al, 1989) , or more recently, patterns of activation across arrays of processing units (Rumelhart, et.al, 1986; McClelland, et.al., 1986) inside individual actors, distributed cognition looks for a broader class of cognitive events and does not expect all such events to be encompassed by the skin or skull of an individual.
When one applies these principles to the observation of human activity "in the wild", at least three interesting kinds of distribution of cognitive process become apparent: cognitive processes may be distributed across the members of a social group, cognitive processes may be distributed in the sense that the operation of the cognitive system involves coordination between internal and external (material or environmental) structure, and processes may be distributed through time in such a way that the products of earlier events can transform the
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Last update: 5/18/00 2 nature of later events. The effects of these kinds of distribution of process are extremely important to an understanding of human cognition. (Rumelhart, et al, 1986) . The nearly perfect mirror symmetry of the titles of Vygotsky's and Minsky's books suggests that something special might be happening in systems of distributed processing, whether the processors are neurons, connectionist nodes, areas of a brain, whole persons, groups of persons, or groups of groups of persons.
Mind in Society
For many people, distributed cognition means cognitive processes that are distributed across the members of a social group (Salomon, 1993) . The fundamental question here is how the cognitive processes we normally associate with an individual mind can be implemented in a group of individuals? A wide range of disciplines in the social sciences has explored this question.
Treating memory as a socially distributed cognitive function has a long history in sociology and anthropology. Durkheim, and his students, especially Halbwachs (1925) , maintained that memory could not even be coherently discussed as a property of an isolated individual. Roberts (1964) proposed that social organization could be read as a sort of architecture of cognition at the community level. He characterized the cognitive properties of a society (its memory capacity and ability to manage and retrieve information) by looking at what information there is, where it is located, and how it can move in a society. Anthropologists and sociologists studying knowledge and memory, social psychologists studying small-group problem solving and jury decision making, organizational scientists studying organizational learning, philosophers of science studying discovery processes, and economists and political scientists exploring the relations of individual and group rationality, all have taken stances that lead them to a consideration of the cognitive properties of societies of individuals. There is ample evidence that the cognitive properties of a group can differ from the cognitive properties of the members of the group. It is important to keep this fact in mind when thinking about human cognitive capabilities.
The Society of Mind
The work described above looks for mind-like properties in social groups. This is the Mind in Society reading. The metaphor can be run the other way as well as is done in Minsky's Society of Mind (1985) . Rather than using the language of mind to describe what is happening in a social group, the language of social groups can be used to describe what is happening in a mind.
Minsky argued that to explain intelligence we need to consider a large system of experts or agencies that can be assembled together in various configurations to get things done. Minsky also allowed that a higher level agency itself could be composed of lower level agencies. With Papert (Minsky and Papert, 1988) , he argued that the low-level agencies (the ones that take on "toy- (Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1985) . He argued that every high-level cognitive function appears twice: first as an interpsychological process and only later as an intrapsychological process. The new functional system inside the child is brought into existence in the interaction of the child with others (typically adults) and with artifacts. As a consequence of the experience of interactions with others, the child eventually may become able to create the functional system in the absence of the others. This could be seen in Minsky's terms as a mechanism for the propagation of a functional skill from one society of mind to another. From the perspective of distributed cognition, this sort of individual learning is seen as the propagation of a particular sort of pattern through a community. Cultural practices assemble agencies into working assemblages and put the assemblages to work. Some of these assemblages may be entirely contained in an individual, and some may span several individuals and material artifacts. The patterns of activity that are repeatedly created in cultural practices may lead to the consolidation of functional assemblages, the atrophy of agencies that are rarely used, and the
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Interaction as a source of novel structure
An important property of aggregate systems is that they may give rise to forms of organization that cannot develop in the component parts. Freyd (1983) argued that some of the features of language that are identified as linguistic universals could arise out of the necessity of sharing the linguistic code. Once having developed in this larger system, they may become elements of cultural practices and thereby become available for appropriation by individuals.
This sort of scheme may be a partial solution to the paradox of how simple systems can lead to more complex ones.
The Material Environment.
A second major thread in the fabric of distributed cognition concerns the role of the material environment in cognitive activity. Again, the question of where to bound the unit of analysis arises. The potential of the material environment to support memory is very widely recognized. But, the environment can be more than a memory. Cognitive activity is sometimes situated in the material world in such a way that the environment is a computational medium.
Cognitive Artifacts are the Things that Make Us Smart in the title of Don
Norman's (1993) book. The notion that cognitive artifacts amplify the cognition of the artifact user is fairly commonplace. If one focuses on the products of cognitive activity, cognitive artifacts do seem to amplify human abilities. A calculator seems to amplify one's ability to do arithmetic, writing down something one wants to remember seems to amplify one's memory. Cole and Griffin (1980) with the manipulation of objects to establish a particular state of coordination between the straightedge and the nomogram. This is a very different set of agencies than was involved in doing the problem via algebra and paper and pencil. In fact, the skills that are needed to use the nomogram are the things that Rumelhart, et.al., (1986) say humans are good at: pattern matching, manipulation of objects in the world, and mental simulation of simple dynamics.
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Last update: 5/18/00 9 A computation was performed via the manipulation of a straightedge and nomogram. And the nomogram was designed in such a way that the errors that were possible in algebra are impossible when using the nomogram. It is essential to distinguish the cognitive properties required to manipulate the artifact from the computation that is achieved via the manipulation of the artifact. This is a key point, and the failure to see it clearly has been the source of many difficulties in cognitive science.
Distributing cognition in time
Simon ( 
Conclusion
It does not seem possible to account for the cognitive accomplishments of our species by reference to what is inside our heads alone. One must also consider the cognitive roles of the social and material world. But, how shall we understand the relationships of the social and the material to cognitive processes that take place inside individual human actors? This is the problem that distributed cognition attempts to solve.
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Last update: 5/18/00 10 According to Howard Gardner (1985) a more or less explicit decision was made in cognitive science to leave culture, context, history and emotion out of the early work. These were recognized as important phenomena, but their inclusion made the problem of understanding cognition very complex. The "Classical" vision of cognition that emerged was built from the inside out starting with the idea that the mind was a central logic engine. From that starting point, it followed that memory could be seen as retrieval from a stored symbolic database, that problem solving was a form of logical inference, that the environment is a problem domain, and that the body was an input device (Clark, 1996) . Attempts to reintegrate culture, context, and history into this model of cognition have proved very frustrating. The distributed cognition perspective aspires to rebuild cognitive science from the outside in, beginning with the social and material setting of cognitive activity, so that culture, context, and history can be linked with the core concepts of cognition.
